Problems With Game Theory Mechanics in Distributed Systems
We have already understood game
theory and its usage in cryptoeconomics, in this blog we will look at the
problems that might come with using game theory in a decentralised, distributed
system. Lets quickly look at the problems that it might cause:
Despite the incentive structures and game theory
mechanics driving honest behavior in the Bitcoin network, there are some
important issues that are widely recognized. Centralization of mining as a result
of mining pools has led to concerns that the reinforcing Nash Equilibrium of
the system can be compromised through a 51% attack.
This is where malicious miners control enough of
the network hashing power to fork the blockchain, overriding the coordination
game played out by a decentralized network of miners. Due to this, some view
incentive mechanisms as not particularly necessary or only necessary as a last
resort of cryptocurrency platforms due to the
complications in system logic that they create.
The empirical problem laid out by critics is that
the success of game theory models in these platforms cannot be determined
academically, only through practice. Some of the assumptions made by game
theory models in cryptocurrency platforms revolve around a specific threshold
of people acting honestly or dishonestly. Predicating platform security on implied
assumptions of human behavior can be risky, especially when there is no
precedent for the technology or models being implemented.
Bitcoin as a decentralized network is built on the uncoordinated choice concept
where coordination between parties is limited by the size of parties
interacting with each other. Centralized mining pools do not follow this
concept and therefore create a viable security concern.
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